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Abstract As financing protection against mountain hazards
becomes increasingly challenging and therefore investments
have to be prioritized, dilemmas of justice emerge: some local
governments and individuals benefit from natural hazard pro-
tection schemes, whereas others loose. Decisions on whom to
protect often caused contradicting concepts of political under-
standing, which differ in interpretations of fair resource allo-
cation and distribution. This paper analyses the impact of dif-
ferent philosophical schools of social justice onmountain haz-
ard management in Austria. We used data from a spatially
explicit, object-based assessment of elements at risk and com-
pared potential distributional effects of three political jurisdic-
tions. We found that—depending on the respective political
direction—various local governments gain and others loose
within the actual distributional system of mitigation strategies.
The implementation of a utilitarian policy approach would
cause that high income communities in hazard-prone areas
would mainly benefit. Consequently, this policy direction
would encourage the public administration to ignore their
own failure in the past natural hazards management and
prevention. On the other hand, following a Rawlsians ap-
proach mainly peripheral communities would gain from new
policy direction who often show besides natural hazards prob-
lemmainly large socio-economic challenges. Finally, the most
radical change would include the implementation of a liberal-
ism policy, whereabouts the state only provides hazard infor-
mation, but no further mitigation measures. These findings
highlight the distributional consequences of future mountain
hazard management strategies and point to the crucial selec-
tion of policy direction in navigating the selection of various
adaptation schemes.
Keywords Social justice . Political economy . Risk
reduction . Distributional consequences .Mountain hazards
Introduction
Since the beginning of 2000s, the Austrian natural hazard
funding policy is following a mixture of egalitarianism and
utilitarianism social justices’ direction (see also Thaler and
Hartmann 2016). The national government introduced to
prioritise the investment based on cost-benefit analysis, where
the highest benefit-cost ratio gets implemented first (Sinabell
and Url 2007; BMLFUW 2009). One reason for this result is
that the overall budget and the resource distribution over the
federal states is mainly disaster-driven (Thaler 2014), which
means that after major strikes investments for mitigation and
adaptation are repeatedly shifted towards these federal states
(Raschky and Weck-Hannemann 2007). However, the alloca-
tion of flood protection measures is equally distributed in
terms of protection level and also in terms of funding between
nine different federal states. However, several natural hazard
events, such as those that occurred in 2002, 2005, and 2013 in
Austria, caused high damages for the environment and
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humanity, and losses for the economy (Habersack et al. 2004,
2009; Blöschl et al. 2013). This has focused the attention of
policy makers and other stakeholders of how to approach the
topic of natural hazard protection, which is that not everyone
is threatened equally by hazard events. This has led to an
increasing discussion on changes beyond that of vulnerability
and natural hazards (Fuchs 2009; Giupponi and Biscaro
2015). This change has driven a transformation in the role of
the state in terms of responsibility sharing and increased indi-
vidual responsibilities for mitigation and adaptation (Adger
et al. 2013, 2016; Thaler and Levin-Keitel 2016).
Additionally, the transformation of responsibility has been
encouraged with the implementation of the EU Floods
Directive in 2007, such as the introduction of Areas of
Potentially Significant Flood Risk (APSFR),1 insurance com-
panies, or international risk-averse investors which request a
re-thinking of the current financial distribution within hazard
management (EC 2007; BMLFUW 2011, 2014; Penning-
Rowsell 2015; Husby et al. 2016). One key question refers
to the problem of social justice and injustice within this new
policy direction, which plays a central role in the ongoing
natural hazard management policy (Collins 2010; Grineski
et al. 2012).
Debates on social justices and equity in managing natural
hazards and risk became more prominent in the past 10 years
(Fielding and Burningham 2005; Colton 2007; Johnson et al.
2007; Walker and Burningham 2011; Thaler and Hartmann
2016). In particular, after Hurricane Katrina in 2005, various
publications addressed the question about social and spatial
inequality with the aim to understand the impact of natural
disasters on low-income households (such as Dixon and
Ramutsindela 2006; Elliott and Pais 2006; Bullard and Warf
2009; Walker and Burningham 2011). The research mainly
concentrated on the question of which parts of a population
(racial/ethnic or low-income individuals) are significantly
higher exposed to natural hazards than others (Fielding and
Burningham 2005; Colton 2007; Chakraborty et al. 2014;
Grineski et al. 2015; Montgomery and Chakraborty 2015;
Maldonado et al. 2016). These studies, however, strongly
followed the tradition of the 1980s discourse on environmen-
tal injustices, where authors argued that environmental injus-
tice is mainly based on the socio-economic status leading to a
disproportionate and unequal exposure of individuals (Walker
2012; Harrison 2014). Similar discussion can be found in the
discussion within climate justices, whereabouts the focus of
climate justices lie on unequal distribution of the effects of
climate change (Schlosberg and Collins 2014; Schlosberg
et al. 2017). In recent years, the research focus concentrated
on the challenge of inequality within the post-event phase,
such as unequal distribution of federal resources after an event
in terms of psychological assistance or financial support
(Elliott and Pais 2006; Munoz and Tate 2016).
The latter shifted the debate on distributional consequences
(e.g., priorities, resource allocation) of current policy strate-
gies in climate change adaptation (Holland 2017). Local cli-
mate adaptation strategies often confront the challenge of
prioritisation of resources in adaptation strategies. The main
reason is that some social groups are excluded from the plan-
ning and implementation process through lack of empower-
ment (e.g., resources or knowledge). Climate change adapta-
tion strategies are highly technical-oriented with the goal to
protect one group, which might include larger negative con-
sequences for others (Thaler and Priest 2014; Holland 2017;
Schlosberg et al. 2017). Above all studies from the UK
analysed the impact of policy changes within natural hazard
management on the society, to demonstrate who gains and
who loses from this change (Penning-Rowsell and Pardoe
2012a, b, 2015). This debate again encouraged the question
of how funding for natural hazard and risk management
should be distributed within a country, and how a respective
policy should look like (spatially approach). Hence, future
policy might change in either direction, especially if the finan-
cial situation of a state is not strong enough to rise the share in
investments of state expenditures (Thaler and Priest 2014;
Thaler et al. 2016). Besides, a study by Röthlisberger et al.
(2017) showed potential approaches for prioritisation in risk
reduction and natural hazards management strategies in
Switzerland. However, these studies are mainly ex-post ori-
ented with the limitation to show changes from past decisions.
In this paper, we provide an ex-ante view of potential impacts
by government changes. In particular, to show the potential
consequences and implications for the society.
Social justices in natural hazard management
The concept of justice has a broad understanding and in-
terpretation (Elster 1992; Mill 2010; Patrick 2014).
Basically, justice concerns questions on the allocation of
wealth (resources), participation, and recognition across
different members of a society (Schlosberg 2007).
Various models and methods can be distinguished, which
allow for different interpretations. Neoclassic approaches,
for example, have a strong focus on fair distribution and
allocation within a market system (Thaler and Hartmann
2016). Nevertheless, studies also report on injustice
resulting from a combination between socio-economic
and cultural injustice (Schlosberg 2007). Cultural factors
1 The current Austrian flood risk management plan insist the prioritisation of
natural hazards mitigation for Areas of Potentially Significant Flood Risk
(APSFR) across the country. The designation of the Areas of Potentially
Significant Flood Risk (APSFR) is mainly based on four categories: (1) num-
ber of people per river mile; (2) infrastructure; (3) industrial complexes with
major accidents treats, such as Seveso II industries; and (4) cultural heritage.
However, the most important variable was number of people (more than 600
per km) which counted 79% in the overall designation of the APSFR areas
(BMLFUW 2015).
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are reflected in discrimination of nationality, sexuality,
gender, or/and ethnicity (Fraser 1995), and they are
characterised in a cultural domination of one or more
groups with the result of not recognising and disrespecting
minor groups. Therefore, material unequal distribution re-
flects income and property ownership of each individual
citizen. Unequal economic distribution means barriers to
access at labour market, education system, and health care
and also unequal access to living space with the effect that
marginalised population more often inhabits hazard-prone
areas based on socio-economic inequality. To overcome
these effects, Honneth (2001) suggested the institutional
framework as a key driver in the question of social justice
and equity. As a result, social justice can be addressed as a
link between ‘how, and in what way, individuals recognise
on another reciprocally’ (ibid: 45), and the rules of distri-
bution (material and cultural) are mirrors of society and
their institutions. Additionally, ‘rules of distribution cannot
simply be derived from the relations of production, but are
rather to be seen as the institutional expression of a socio-
cultural dispositive that determines in what esteem partic-
ular activities are held at a specific point in time’ (ibid: 54).
Conflicts over distribution can be only understood as ‘sym-
bolic struggles over the legitimacy of the sociocultural dis-
positive’ (ibid: 54). To achieve a fair distribution, the po-
litical discussion and especially institutions (formal and
informal) have to be changed. Justice in natural hazard
and risk management demands more than just a fair
socio-economic distribution or recognition of cultural roots
(Campbell 2012; May and Morrow 2012; Neal et al. 2014;
Zwarteveen and Boelens 2014). Justice also relates to the
process by which a certain distribution is selected (proce-
dural justice), but this aspect is not covered by this paper.
Instead, the type of justice (and philosophical tradition)
discussed in this article will concern questions of alloca-
tion and distribution of resources and, further, capital and
wealth across different members of society.
The key contribution of this study is to examine the
potential impacts of changing the current natural hazard
management policy in Austria on distributional effects in
showing possible impacts of three philosophical schools
(utilitarianism, Rawlsians, libertarianism, see also
appendix A). The focus lies on the question of the impact
on the distributional effects when following strictly one of
the three philosophical schools in natural hazard manage-
ment. Thus, the main aim is to demonstrate how various
directions within the social justice debate potentially af-
fect the national hazard mitigation policy in Austria.
Accordingly, we focus on the question of how distribu-
tional effects can be organised within the country based
on three theoretical schools within the social justice de-
bate. The selected schools focus their key concept and
main arguments around distributional effects of new
policy concepts and strategies. The key questions sur-
rounding those problems include the following:
& What are the potential impacts of changing national risk
mitigation strategies in Austria based on different justice
frameworks?
& Which regions would profit from a change in the national
risk mitigation strategy towards a more Rawlsians under-
standing of social justice?
This paper is distinguished in two main sections. The first
part focuses on the theoretical discussion of social justices,
which provided the analytical framework for our study. In
the second part, we present results of our experimental study.
The focus is on the question of distributional impacts if the
Austrian natural hazard management policy would change for
the period 2016–2045.
Data and methods
The study was conducted in three consecutive steps. The first
step was the identification of buildings exposed to snow ava-
lanches and flood hazards (from the year 2012). The actual
state of exposure to natural hazards provided the starting point
for the experimental analysis of the impacts of different poli-
cies. In the second step, we developed a method for consider-
ing the different hierarchical units in the impact analysis. On
the basis of this framework, the third step included the evalu-
ation of the outcome of each policy for the period 2016–2045.
Assessing natural hazard exposure
In this paper, assessed hazards included river and torrential
flooding in mountain areas as well as snow avalanches. The
Austrian legislation foresees the introduction of hazard zones
in land use planning to regulate the land use development;
these are mandatory mainly for the upper part of the catch-
ments. Themethod for delimiting hazard zones is regulated by
a national legal act (Republic of Austria 1975) and an associ-
ated decree (Republic of Austria 1976; compare Holub and
Fuchs 2009). Hazard maps are based on a design event with a
frequency of 1 in 150 years, and an event occurring more
frequent with a return period of 1 in 10 years (ibid.). The
underlying magnitude is related to the expected impact pres-
sure and flow height, respectively. In overall, red hazard zones
indicate those areas where the permanent utilisation for settle-
ment and traffic purposes is not possible or only possible with
extraordinary efforts for mitigation measures. Yellow hazard
zones indicate those areas where a permanent utilisation for
settlement and traffic purposes is impaired by hazard process-
es. However, main critique includes (i) that hazard maps show
only the actual situation, without taking into account future
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developments, such as process dynamics resulting from cli-
mate change (Auer et al. 2007; Keiler et al. 2010; Huggel et al.
2012) as well as (ii) that the focus is on the actual hazard
extent in the respective run-out areas (mainly residential areas)
and excludes a broader view of the space, e.g. with respect to
agricultural land use in the drafting process of hazard maps.
We defined exposed buildings as built structures that are
susceptible to mountain hazards. Therefore, we overlaid the
national building inventory data with the hazard maps in a
geographic information system (GIS) (Fuchs et al. 2015,
2017). The Austrian building and residents inventory was
provided by the Federal Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry,
Environment, and Water Management. We classified each
building by 14 categories based on its main use and
calculated the economic value of each building. The
economic valuation is conducted by an economic module
based on building type as well as average construction costs
based on Kranewitter (2002) and Keiler et al. (2006). Further,
the construction costs were analysed based on replacement
value (Fuchs and McAlpin 2005). The dataset including the
buildings, their functionality and values, and their number of
residents was delineated from the Austrian residential register.
This dataset and the method for processing the data are de-
scribed in-depth by Fuchs et al. (2015). Each building was
overlaid with the hazard maps to know the current exposure
in Austria. Furthermore, we aggregated the numbers of ex-
posed and non-exposed buildings for the areal units of local
governments. With these numbers, we computed the share of
exposed buildings, and the ratio of the average building values
of exposed and non-exposed buildings.
Hierarchical units of analysis
For the exposure analysis, the analysis was done on an object-
based level (individual house in a hazard zone), and the data
were aggregated at the required level, depending on the cho-
sen policy scenario.
& The first level refers to the building data. A building object
is represented spatially by a point and has the following
attributes: the type of functionality, the reconstruction val-
ue of the building, and the number of principal residents.
Each building object is member of (i) an administrative
unit (i.e. of a local government and of a region) and (ii) of
a hazard zone.
& The second level refers to the hazard zones in Austria. A
hazard zone is represented by a polygon. The different
classes of hazard zones (red and yellow zones depending
on the process intensities) and overlapping or
neighbouring hazard zones are merged into one polygon
representing a hazard zone. Therefore, the hazard process
type and the process intensities are not differentiated in
this study. A hazard zone polygon is member of an
administrative unit (of a local government and of a region)
and provides the reference unit for the future investigation
in our analysis.
& The third level refers to the local administrative unit. The
main aggregation and reference unit is the smallest admin-
istrative unit at local level, i.e. the area of responsibility of
a local government. All financial projects invested in risk
prevention at hazard zone level are summed up at local
level.
With this topological setting, the analysis was done on an
object-based level (individual house in a hazard zone), and the
data were aggregated at the required level, depending on the
chosen policy scenario.
Implementation of policy scenarios
The concept of utilitarianism, developed by classical econo-
mists, such as John Stuart Mill and Graham Bentham, under-
stands justice and equity as the sum of individual benefits. The
aim of utilitarianism is to ‘maximise the total potential happi-
ness of society as a whole through the aggregation of individ-
ual happiness’ (Johnson et al. 2007: 376). Thereby, the focus
is on benefits of each individual (Bartel 2002), and conse-
quently, policy discussion should ensure maximal benefit of
society (‘greatest benefit to the greatest number’, Hunold and
Young 1998: 84). In natural hazard management, utilitarian-
ism develops criteria which should be chosen to secure the
highest risk reduction per unit of resource input. Natural haz-
ard risk management strategies provided to those areas within
country, where the benefits offer the greatest gain to the soci-
ety (Johnson et al. 2007).
Rawls (2005) defined justice as the equal distribution of
basic rights and duties within a society. Justices will be de-
fined by the society, who defines a common understanding of
what social justice is, as well as which actions insurance the
basic needs for each individual within the society. Based on
this understanding, Rawls tolerates injustices, if unequal de-
velopments in society increase the overall benefit (wealth) of a
society. However, if the outcome reflects injustice, individuals
will not be punished/discriminated in another aspect.
Referring to natural hazard and risk management, an applica-
tion of Rawls’ concept of justice requests to distribute re-
sources to most vulnerable people and objectives (Johnson
et al. 2007). Therefore, the key objective is to select risk man-
agement strategies not only and inevitably for high-value as-
sets and areas of high-value aggregation (Johnson et al. 2008).
The main focus of liberalism is in general a concept of free
market thinking, with a particular focus on competition, avail-
ability of full information, equilibrium in market processes,
and freedom of individual self-decision (economic freedom,
Hayek 1991; Harrison 2014). Key aspects include the avail-
ability of full information, which are mainly pre-defined rules
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equally to each individual (Hayek 1991). The allocation of
goods and services is based on equilibrium (Pareto) principles.
In natural hazard management policy, the strategies are
organised and planned by the sum of individual preferences
which are based on rational choice decisions (Varian 1975;
Harvey 1999; Bowen and Wells 2002). Consequently, there
is a limited influence of the public sector on the natural hazard
management policies. As a result, the state would be reduced
towards providing hazard information to individuals (Thaler
and Hartmann 2016), but the individuals have to manage their
risk individually, such as through local structural protection
measures or insurance (Holub and Fuchs 2009; Penning-
Rowsell 2015). The overlaying and aggregation procedures
depend on the respectively policy scenario.
Utilitarianism
For the first policy scenario (utilitarianism), we conducted the
following steps:
1. The hazard maps were overlaid with the building dataset.
2. For each hazard zone, we summed up the reconstruction
values of the exposed buildings.
3. Hazardmapswith the aggregated exposed building values
were sorted in a descending order. This resulted in a pri-
ority list for investments by the sum of exposed vales at
risk per hazard zone.
4. It was assumed that following the priority list, in each
year, the buildings in a specific number of hazard zones
would be protected by defence structures. We assumed a
total number of 60 projects2 per year for a period of
30 years (2016–2045).
5. At the end of the period, the number of new protection
schemes invested following the priority list was summed
up at local level. A principal assumption in this study is
that from now until the end of the reference period, no
more houses will be built in exposed areas. Risk reduction
measures will be focused on existing exposed assets only.
This showed spatial locations where investment in natural
hazard management would be distributed in 30 years fol-
lowing this policy.
Rawlsians
For the second policy scenario (Rawlsians), we conducted the
following steps:
1. The hazard maps were overlaid with the buildings dataset.
2. Local governments were classified by their vulnerabil-
ity. Because there is no dataset for classifying the vul-
nerability and the coping capacity of the Austrian local
governments, respectively, we elaborated simple indi-
cators for a vulnerability classification (Papathoma-
Köhle et al. 2017). We used more than one indicator
to demonstrate challenges and uncertainties within the
decision-making process. The first indicator (i) was
the share of the number of exposed buildings in com-
parison to the total number of buildings per local au-
thority (Fuchs et al. 2015). The higher the number of
exposed buildings was in relation to the total number
of buildings within the local government, the higher
was the vulnerability. As a second indicator, we select-
ed the share of the sum of exposed building values to
the total sum of monetary building values (ii) for each
local government (Fuchs et al. 2017). The third indi-
cator was based on the average monetary value of the
exposed buildings compared to the average monetary
value of all buildings in each local government (iii). A
value > 1 means that exposed buildings are more cost-
ly than the average of all buildings in the local gov-
ernment. A value < 1 means that the exposed buildings
are less worth than the average of the total building
stock in the local authority. The highest ranking in
terms of vulnerability had the local government with
the lowest value for this indicator. It is assumed that
local government where the exposed buildings have a
lower monetary value than the average are more vul-
nerable than others. Hence, this indicator represents an
important factor to classify social vulnerability of each
local government (Cutter et al. 2003). The local gov-
ernment were classified and ranked by each of these
three indicators in a descending order.
3. Classification of the vulnerability of Austrian local
governments for the Rawlsians policy is depending
on how we define vulnerability. In this paper, we dis-
tinguish between three different possibilities: option a,
classification based on the share between the number
of exposed buildings and the total number of build-
ings; option b, classification based on the sum of ex-
posed building values to the total sum of monetary
building values; and option c, classification based on
the mean monetary value of the exposed buildings in
comparison to the mean monetary value of all build-
ings in the respective local authority.
4. As for the utilitarianism approach, we assumed that 60
projects for natural hazard risk reduction would be fi-
nanced per year and invested accordingly to the priority
list based on step 2.
5. At the end of the period, the investments following the
priority list of vulnerable local governments were
2 The Austrian Torrent and Avalanche Control Authority invests between 60
and 70 million € per year in new protection measures (BMF 2016). We as-
sumed that an average cost of 1 mio. € for a project that reduces the hazards in
one single hazard zone. The government implemented 60 mitigation strategies
per hazard zone per year.
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summed up at local level. This shows the distributional
effects in the 30 years period.
Liberalism
For the third policy scenario (liberalism), we assume that the
Austrian natural hazards system change towards a self-
oriented risk management policy; including no public funding
from the national government. The citizens living in the
hazard-prone areas have to organise their individual protection
scheme. For the third policy scenario (Liberalism), we con-
ducted the following steps:
1. The hazard maps were overlaid with the buildings dataset.
2. We elaborated a map of the exposed building values, ag-
gregated at the level of the local governments. This
map—together with the hazard maps—should provide
the information of the relevance of natural hazards for
the public and for stakeholders in the economy.
3. Evaluation of distribution of hazard maps in Austria.
Results
Current situation in the Austrian natural hazards
management
Figure1provides informationon themonetaryvaluesexposed to
mountain hazards. The datasets of exposed buildings, monetary
values, and residents provided the input for the analyses of dis-
tributional effects. The highest monetary values of buildings ex-
posed tomountain hazards—except froma fewoutliers—canbe
found among touristic hotspots in Austria, mainly in the Federal
states ofSalzburg andTyrol,wheremany tourist infrastructure in
the various skiing areas can be found in hazard-prone areas
(Fuchs et al. 2015). The starting point for the model experiment
is showninFig.1. Inoverall,outofa totalof2,399,500buildings,
120,682 buildings are exposed tomountain hazardswithin 9978
hazard zones distributed across the nineFederal States.Basedon
the topography and the characteristic geomorphic processes act-
ing on the land surface, the eastern part of Austria shows a low
number of hazard zones defined under the degree of hazard zon-
ing (Republic of Austria 1976) compared to the western part.
b) share of exposed building valuesa) share of exposed buildings
c) ratio of exposed to non-exposed average building values d) absolute numbers of exposed buildings
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Fig. 1 The actual state of exposure to mountain hazards and the starting
point of the experimental study for the policy impact analysis. a The share
of exposed buildings to the total number of buildings in the administrative
units of the local governments in Austria. b The share of the exposed
building values to the total building values. The highest shares are found
in the central and western parts of the country (especially in the federal
states Salzburg, Tyrol, and Vorarlberg). c The spatial distribution of the
ratio of average building values. Local governments with an average
building value of exposed buildings less than the average building
value within the areal unit are preferably located in rural and remote
areas. In d, the absolute numbers of exposed buildings are shown
(quantiles)
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Spatial distribution of funding under a utilitarianism
policy framework
The implication of the introduction of a strict utilitarianism
policy approach within the Austrian natural hazard manage-
ment system would have large impacts on the current funding
distribution in Austria. The system would look like the
English flood risk management policy (Johnson et al. 2007;
Thaler and Hartmann 2016). In Fig. 2, the spatial and temporal
analysis of the distribution of funding for the Austrian moun-
tain hazards policy is presented. Between 2016 and 2045, the
utilitarianism approach would allow investments into 1800
projects to reduce future impacts of hazard events. At the
end of the period, 83,848 buildings with 264,285 residents
and with roughly 46.7 billion € of building values would have
gained from this policy in terms of the implementation of new
structural protection measures. The mean stock of assets se-
cured per hazard zone is about 256 million €. The range of
choice for the Austrian investment projects show that the con-
centration of funding would be mainly around the touristic hot
spots in Austria (federal state of Salzburg and Tyrol) as well as
the federal state of Styria, where a large amount of residential
and industrial buildings can be found in hazard-prone areas.
On the other hand, the federal states of Vorarlberg, Lower and
Upper Austria would loose from the new direction within the
funding policy. The main reason is the settlement pattern in
these federal states, where building pattern are more dispersed
in contrast to other federal states in Austria.
Remarkable differences emerged between the different lo-
cal governments in Austria. Analysing the local level, the
main winners of this policy would be local governments in
Salzburg and Tyrol, such as (1) Sankt Leonhard im Pitztal
(federal state of Tyrol) with 15 projects for the period 2016–
2045, (2) Kapfenberg (federal state of Styria) with 11 projects
for the period 2016–2045, (3) Bad Hofgastein (federal state of
Salzburg) for 10 projects for the period 2016–2045, and (4)
Kappl (federal state of Tyrol) with 10 projects for the same
period. Key targets are again the touristic hotspots in Austria,
where the tourism sector has the main contribution to the local
economy, except of the city of Kapfenberg. The local author-
ity Kapfenberg includes a large amount of residential build-
ings as well as industry complexes in the hazard-prone areas.
Using the relative relationship (number of projects to the total
number of hazard zones in the federal state), the main winners
would be the Federal State of Salzburg followed by the federal
states of Tyrol and Carinthia (see Table 1).
Spatial distribution of funding under a Rawlsians policy
framework
Analysing the distributional effects under the Rawlsians pol-
icy estimates different results in dependence on the selection
of indicators. In Fig. 2 and Table 1, the potential implications
for the Austrian natural hazard policy are presented. Like the
utilitarianism policy framework, under the Rawlisians system,
the Austrian government would realise 1800 projects across
the country within the time period between 2016 and 2045. By
the end of this period, in overall under Rawl’s investment
policy, the government would protect 157,603, 155,264, and
71,547 residents based on the option a, b, and c.
b) Rawlsians policy framework, share of exposed buildingsa) Utilitarianism policy framework
c) Rawlsians policy framework, share of exposed values
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6 -10
11 - 15
16 - 36
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d) Rawlsians policy framework, ratio of average building values
0
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0 100 20050
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0 100 20050
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Fig. 2 Sum of projects invested in local governments following a the utilitarianism policy framework for investments in risk reduction measures in the
period 2016–2045 in Austria and b, c, d the Rawlsians policy framework in the period 2016–2045 in Austria
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In terms of building reconstruction values, the Rawlsians
funding policy would protect 28.5, 29.4 respectively 9.5
billion €. Following the different policy options, the results
show a wide range of spatial distribution within the funding
system. In particular, selecting option c in the distribution of
funding would refer mainly to peripheral local governments
with a lower economic activity and with a strong focus on
agriculture, respectively. Large differences were also found
at regional scale in the relative comparison between numbers
of projects and total hazard zones (Table 1). Under options a
and b, the main winners would be the federal states of
Lower Austria, Salzburg, and Styria. The numbers and con-
sequently the spatial distribution of profiteers drastically
change if option c is chosen, which would distribute the
funding towards the federal states of Burgenland, Tyrol,
and Vorarlberg. Such disparities in the results strongly de-
pend on the method chosen and show that these federal
states have mainly buildings with a low value at risk in
hazard-prone areas.
Looking at the local scale, options a and b showed sim-
ilar results in terms of the locations benefitting from this
policy perspective (Stumm and Fügen in the federal state
of Tyrol, St. Anton im Montafon and Innerbraz in the federal
state of Vorarlberg). The main reason for this similarity is
the large number of detached houses, moreover, tourism
dominates areas which results in a high number of exposed
hotels. On the other hand, option c would move the funding
towards low-income families in hazard-prone areas, such as
householders in the local governments Zell am Ziller (feder-
al state of Tyrol), Stolzalpe (federal state of Styria),
Mannersdorf am Leithagebirge (federal state of Lower
Austria), and St. Jakob im Rosental (federal state of
Carinthia). Main winners would be local governments in
former industrial areas with structural economic problems
or peripheral-rural areas.
Spatial distribution of funding under a liberalism policy
framework
Hazard reduction under a liberalism approach would
throughout restructure the Austrian natural hazards system
towards a self-oriented risk management policy, including
strengthening of self-responsibility (Holub and Fuchs
2009). A first transformation would refer to the imple-
mentation of a free market mechanism in terms of com-
pensation, such as the introduction of risk-based insurance
systems without public compensation and subvention
(Ungern-Sternberg 2004; Fuchs 2009). A second change
would affect the realisation of structural measures such as
investments in flood-proofing measures instead of large
embankments and would transfer the responsibility to in-
dividual householders. Consequently, this step would re-
frame the question of who pays and who gains, because
only house owners in hazard-prone zones would have to
invest in natural hazard management (Fig. 3). A third
change would refer to the provision of information.
Hayek (1991), for example, had foreseen the availability
and provision of full information as the central character-
istic for individual decision behaviour. This means that
hazard information has to be very transparent and has to
show the individual risk at each location (at individual
building level) within the country (Penning-Rowsell
2015). In Austria, for example, such policy would require
the design of local-scale hazard and object-specific risk
maps. So far, this kind of information is partly available
for the country. Nevertheless, various federal states in the
eastern part of Austria show a lack of realisation of local-
scale hazard maps providing the basis for elaborating risk
maps (see also appendix B). The challenge might be that
the public administration cannot ensure the necessary in-
formation for the individuals.
Table 1 Number of projects invested in the communities following the utilitarianism and Rawlsians policy in the period 2016–2045 in Austria,
aggregated on regional level
Utilitarianism Rawlsians
Federal State % No. of projects in
comparison to total
hazard zones in the region
No. of projects in comparison
to total hazard zones in the
region for option (a) [%]
No. of projects in comparison
to total hazard zones in the
region for option (b) [%]
No. of projects in comparison
to total hazard zones in the
region for option (c) [%]
Burgenland 12.50 13.11 14.89 27.60
Carinthia 17.40 5.13 5.85 21.23
Lower Austria 15.70 48.21 46.77 17.74
Upper Austria 12.90 22.77 22.77 19.19
Salzburg 47.80 22.57 22.81 13.89
Styria 14.00 4.44 3.19 19.38
Tyrol 23.10 0.00 0.00 0.00
Vienna 0.00 14.92 15.03 10.59
Vorarlberg 14.10 13.11 14.89 27.60
T. Thaler et al.
Discussion
Implications of different national riskmitigation strategies
In overall, the existing Austrian system of natural hazard and
risk management ensures a high level of protection which is
equally distributed within the country (Thaler and Hartmann
2016). Nevertheless, the analyses and the debate of the distri-
butional consequences were largely ignored in the current
policy, such as in many other countries (Penning-Rowsell
and Pardoe 2015). However, in the past years, we observe a
first change in the Austrian natural hazard management sys-
tem, which is mainly based on various interests and external
developments, such as the implementation of EU legislation
(EC 2007), an increase of exposed buildings within hazard-
prone areas in some regions of the country (Fuchs et al. 2015,
2017) and economic and financial crises with the consequence
of a change within the current spatial distribution on subsidies
for natural hazard mitigation. This paper debated and showed
the potential implications if the national government would
shift the current system towards a more risk-based and
vulnerability-based policy, respectively. Such a shift would
have large implications for the different householders (posi-
tively and negatively depending on the new policy direction).
The access to state-provided funding for natural hazard man-
agement under a utilitarianism framework would implicate
that economic attractive local governments, especially in the
tourism hotspots of Austria, would again gain mainly from
this policy direction. The resulting governmental focus on
high building values in hazard-prone areas would be on one
side understandable; on the other hand, the government would
encourage the increase of potential losses (Fuchs et al. 2015,
2017). This would generate a situation of moral hazard within
the society, because the Austrian policy so far is based on cost-
benefit analysis when structural mitigation is implemented,
which results in securing clusters of high values by structural
protection measures (Tarlock 2012). Rawlsians justices as
fairness funding policy would instead focus the distribution
towards the most vulnerable groups within the society (Cutter
et al. 2003; Johnson et al. 2007; Thaler and Hartmann 2016).
A central question remains who are the most vulnerable within
a society (Cutter 2003; Wisner et al. 2004; Fuchs et al. 2007).
In general, focussing on the average building value (option c
average monetary value of the exposed buildings), house-
holders with low building values would gain mainly from
the new policy direction. The outcome demonstrates that pe-
ripheral local governments would benefit disproportionately
from new structural protection measures. Such a governmen-
tal activity would protect householders who are often socially
excluded and have a lack of opportunity to protect themselves
(Jacobs 1961; Sen 2010; Lejano and Funderburg 2016).
However, if the Austrian government would choose option a
(number of exposed buildings) or b (sum of the exposed build-
ing values) of the Rawlsian approach, the results provide a
different picture. The public authorities would be able to pro-
vide protection schemes for higher building values and would
secure similar local governments like the utilitarianism, which
contradicts the original idea of Rawls to provide a concept of
social justices as an alternative to the ideas from Graham
Bentham and John Stuart Mill (Lyons 1972; Zerbe and
Plotnick 1988). The main reason is that within options a and
b, the local governments allowed in the past high-value build-
ings to be constructed in hazard-prone areas in contrast to
option c, where high-value buildings, such as hotels or com-
mercial buildings, were built outside the hazard zones.
Consequently, this policy direction would encourage the
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public administration to ignore their own failure in natural
hazards management (Jongman et al. 2012, 2014; Fuchs
et al. 2017; Röthlisberger et al. 2017). Lastly, the implemen-
tation of a liberalism understanding within the Austrian natu-
ral hazard management policy would be the most radical shift
within the society in terms of responsibility (Johnson and
Priest 2008; Thaler and Priest 2014; Mostert 2015; Reese
and Jacob 2015). The central responsibility within the natural
hazard management discourse would be organised by individ-
uals instead of the public administration. The changes would
request that the private property owners have to strengthen the
individual resilience capacity to response to future natural
hazard events, also in terms of collecting information about
the risk (Djordjevic et al. 2011; Kuhlicke et al. 2011; Babcicky
and Seebauer 2017). The consequences were that main losers
would be householders with a high social vulnerability and a
low individual capacity to response to natural hazard events
(Chakraborty et al. 2014; Montgomery and Chakraborty
2015; Maldonado et al. 2016) or especially tenants without
any possibilities for implementing risk reduction measures,
while utilitarian and libertarian principles show similar static
implications. Although the latter indicate less financial re-
sources from public administration dedicated for mitigation,
there is clearly a different dynamic implication. Utilitarian
framework would incentivise building on risky places, while
the libertarian principle would deter it and possibly alter rela-
tive value of properties.
Limitations of the study
However, the results have to be interpreted under consid-
eration of the main limitations. Firstly, the experiment is
based on a static assumption, i.e. the building stock is as-
sumed to be static over the time period, while in reality, it
is remarkably dynamic (Fuchs et al. 2013). Future im-
provements may consider the growing building stock (ex-
posed and non-exposed buildings). With a growing build-
ing stock, the indicators and therefore the priority lists may
change over time and a monitoring of the development
may be required to continuously adapt the policy (e.g. as
proposed by Zischg et al. 2013). Furthermore, the hazard
zones will change over time because of changes in the
flood defence structures or because of climatic changes
(e.g. Staffler et al. 2008; Keiler et al. 2010).
Conclusion
This study examined the different impacts of different social
justice traditionsmight change the spatial distribution of funding
for natural hazard protection schemes. This implicates a strong
political debate on the question whom to protect, or on differ-
entiating between upstream and downstream local governments
or different economic or cultural regions, which raises a central
but barely discussed conflict: who (or rather what) should be
protected against hazard events with highest priority? Such
changes showed not only a transformation within the public
administration but also affected the individual behaviour in
responding to natural hazard events. Consequently, our key find-
ings showed several implications not only for the national policy
on natural hazard management in Austria but also for the dis-
cussion on social justices. We found that depending on the se-
lection of philosophical tradition, the winners and losers will
remarkably change. For instance, prioritisation of structural pro-
tection measures based on utilitarianism would mainly support
the tourism hotspots as well as industrial complexes in the
mountain areas. The consequences would be that the public
administration would acknowledge and encourage constructing
new and more high-value buildings in hazard-prone areas. This
would result in an increase of potential losses across the country.
On the other hand, focus on the most vulnerable groups (based
on mean values of buildings) would mainly support local gov-
ernments in peripheral areas. As such, this policy would mainly
support the main losers from a utilitarianism economic thinking.
Yet, the number of individuals who gain from this policy would
be much lower in comparison to the other potential options. But
in the end, the main question is if the selected philosophical
traditions used in this paper should be adopted by the Austrian
natural hazards management system, or if disaster risk reduction
in Austria needs different/additional instruments and supports.
Therefore, the selected approach for the future policy requires
not only a scientific but also a political debate. In this way, both
the requirements of the EU floods directive and the overall aim
to decrease vulnerability and increase resilience for the reduction
of social exclusion may be considered.
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